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There are no enterprises which would not use computers to fulfill their administrative tasks. 
Computers became part of everyday administration, or, better to say: they became part of 
everyday life. This is why our age is called 'information age'. Both the amount of digital 
data and our dependency from these data has been growing intensively so digital data is 
high-valued as resource. Data owners and/or managers must, or at least ought to, protect 
their data from stealing or tampering with. Luckily standard communication protocols and 
methods have been developed for this purpose, they only ought to be used. If not, that will 
result in a high level of risk. We, at Óbuda University, have been using a computer based 
system called Neptun for about ten years to manage the scholar records of the students. In 
this paper I show some possible motivations and technical solutions why and how one 
could gain unauthorized access to such a system. 
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1  Data must be protected first of all 
Data protection should cover two fields. One field is to protect the data against 
data loss or corruption. The other, and more problematic, field is the protection 
against unauthorized access. This paper is about the second field. 
The problem of the protection against unauthorized access can also  be divided 
into two main fields, of which the first is the protection of the stored data and the 
other is the protection of the data communication between two computers.  We 
will discuss the latter problem. Because of historical reasons all the (historical) network protocols are plain text 
ones, i.e. all of the data of the communication travels via the network as plain text, 
including user names and passwords as well (see fig. 1.). The http protocol our 
browser  uses  when  surfing  the  internet  is  also  such  a  protocol.  [2]  HTTP  is 
unsecure and is subject to eavesdropping attacks, which can let attackers get the 




Example for plain text protocol 
Data encryption is nearly as old as the human communication itself. We know a 
large number of methods from the history to hide the plain text data. Or better to 
say: we know a large number of methods to try to hide it. Computers with their 
unbelievable  computational  power  began  a  new  era  in  both  encryption  and 
decryption. 
1.1  Secure Communication via Untrusted Network 
Mathematicians  could  provide  different  computer  based  methods  for  data 
encryption in private and in business life as well. These methods may even be 
100% fathomless at least in a mathematical meaning. There are two main groups 
of these methods, one-key and two-key encryptions. 
1.2  Method 1: One-key Encryption 
The two communicators use the same key, in other words the same key is used 
both for encryption and decryption. The algorithm can be any simple and bijective 
operation  which  needs  two  bytes  (plain  text  and  key)  to  produce  a  third 
(ciphertext)  one.  Of  course  the  operation  should  have  an  inverse  one.  E.g.  an 
addition of character codes as bytes and key bytes modulo 256 will do. 
The two main rules of such a method are the following: a) the key must be a series 
of real random numbers, b) the key should be kept in total secret. For an early application of this kind of encryption (and, of course, decryption) see 
the well known novel 800 miles in the Amazons by Verne. 
This method is very simple, easy to use, can guarantee a full 100% safety, but has 
one  disadvantage:  needs  a  secure  channel  for  key  exchange,  which  practically 
means that the two participants must personally meat somewhere. This cannot be a 
problem e.g. in the diplomatic corps, but business life demands other methods. 
1.3  Method 2: Two-key Encryption 
Mathematicians could and can provide us methods which do not need a secure 
channel  for  key  exchange.  This  simplifies  the  use  of  data  encryption  both  in 
private and business life. 
The first and well known method of this kind is the RSA-algorithm which was 
published in 1978 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman at MIT; the 
letters RSA are the initials of their family names, listed in the same order as on 
their paper. [3] 
The  first  public  key  application  based  upon  the  RSA-algorithm  was  originally 
created by Philip Zimmermann in 1991. [4] 
No need for a secure channel to distribute keys is a great advantage, but it has a 
price: these method are not 100% safe, theoretically they can be deciphered in 
certain conditions but it would need unreal amount of resources. 
1.4  Some Basics 
In  public  key  cryptosystems  everyone  has  two  related  complementary  keys:  a 
publicly revealed key, called public key and a secret (or private) key. Each of the 
keys unlocks the code that the other key makes. Knowing the public key does not 
help you find the corresponding secret key. The public key can be published and 
widely disseminated. The private key must be kept in total secret. Two-key, or 
public key cryptosystems provide privacy without the need for the same kind of 
secure  channel  that  a  conventional,  one-key  cryptosystem  requires  for  key 
exchange. 
Anyone can use a recipient's public key to encrypt a message to that person, and 
the recipient uses his or her own corresponding secret key to decrypt that message. 
No one but the recipient can decrypt it, because no one else has access to that 
secret key (at least according to rules;). Not even the person who encrypted the 
message can decrypt it. 
Message authentication is also provided. The sender's own secret key can be used 
to  encrypt  a  message,  thereby  signing  it.  This  creates  a  digital  signature  of  a 
message, which anybody can check by using the sender's public key. This process proves that the sender was the true originator of the message, and that the message 
has not been altered by anyone else, because the sender alone possesses the secret 
key that made that signature. Forgery of a signed message is not possible, and the 
sender cannot later disavow his signature. 
Public keys are kept in individual key certificates that include the key owner's 
name,  a  timestamp  of  when  the  key  pair  was  generated,  and  the  actual  key 
material (and other possible fields). 
1.5  Security Rules 
No  data  security  system  is  impenetrable.  Public  key  cryptosystems  can  be 
circumvented  in  a  variety  of  ways.  Potential  vulnerabilities  including 
compromising  of  the  secret  key  and  public  key  tampering  should  be  avoided. 
There  are  many  other  ways  or  by-pass  roads,  of  course,  to  penetrate  such  a 
cryptosystem, e.g. deleted files which are still somewhere on the disk, viruses and 
Trojan horses, electromagnetic emissions, exposure on multi-user systems, or even 
doing  a  traffic  analysis.  Let  us  see  how  we  can  use  public  key  cryptography 
according to Phil Zimmermann, developer of PGP. [7] 
The first rule of security is to keep your secret key, according to its name, in 
secret. If someone gets your secret key, not only can they read your messages but 
they can make signatures in your name as well. 
The second: When you use someone's public key, make certain it has not been 
tampered with. A new public key from someone else should be trusted if, and only 
if, you got it directly from its owner (this would mean you have a secure channel 
for key exchange), or if it has been signed by someone else you trust. Make sure 
no  one  else  can  tamper  with  your  own  public  keys.  Maintain  uninterruptible 
physical control of both the public keys you collected and your secret key and 
keep a backup copy of them. 
1.6  Web of Trust 
Anybody can sign digitally someone else's public key as a a so called introducer. 
You collect signed public keys. "As time goes on, you will accumulate keys from 
other people that you may want to designate as trusted introducers. Everyone else 
will  each  choose  their  own  trusted  introducers.  And  everyone  will  gradually 
accumulate and distribute with their key a collection of certifying signatures from 
other people, with the expectation that anyone receiving it will trust at least one or 
two  of  the  signatures.  This  will  cause  the  emergence  of  a  decentralized  fault-
tolerant web of confidence for all public keys." [7] 
The above mentioned introducers can be enterprises as well. It is a good business 
opportunity to digitally sign as many public key as possible, while the enterprise has an efficient way to distribute it's own authentic public key in all over the 
world.  These  enterprises  are  called  certificate  authorities  or  certification 
authorities (CAs). Some of them are worldwide known and many of them are local 
Cas. 
What is the difference between public keys and certificates? A certificate is a 
digitally  signed  document  to  validate  its  owner's  authorization  and  name.  The 
document consists of a specially formatted block of data that contains the name of 
the certificate holder (which may be either a user or a system name), the holder's 
public key, the begining and end date of validity, as well as the digital signature of 
a  certification  authority  who  digitally  signed  the  certificate.  The  certification 
authority attests that the sender's name is the one associated with the public key in 
the document. 
1.7  Certificates and HTTPS 
HTTPS connections are often used for payment transactions on the World Wide 
Web or for sensitive transactions in corporate information systems or even in a 
scholar  information  system.  HTTPS  stands  for  the  term  Hypertext  Transfer 
Protocol Secure, which is a combination of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol with 
the  SSL/TLS  protocol  to  provide  encryption  and  secure  identification  of  the 
server. 
The main idea of HTTPS is to create a secure channel over an insecure network 
for communication. This ensures reasonable protection from eavesdropping and 
man-in-the-middle  attacks  (see  below),  provided  that  the  server  certificate  is 
verified  and  trusted.    HTTPS  is  designed  to  withstand  such  attacks  and  is 
considered secure against such attacks (with the exception of older deprecated 
versions of SSL). While HTTP URLs begin  with "http://" and use port 80 by 
default, HTTPS URLs begin with the string "https://" and use port 443 by default. 
The details of HTTPS protocol is described in RFC 2818. [8] 
The trust inherent in HTTPS is based on major certificate authorities whose public 
keys come pre-installed in browser software to be used for signature checking 
(this is equivalent to saying "I trust certificate authority (e.g. VeriSign) to tell me 
who I should trust"). Therefore an HTTPS connection to a website can be trusted 
if (and only if) all of the following are true: 
a) The website provides a valid certificate (an invalid certificate shows a warning 
pop-up  window  in  most  browsers),  which  means  it  was  signed  by  a  trusted 
authority;  
b) The certificate correctly identifies the website (e.g. visiting https://www.uni-
obuda.hu and receiving a certificate for "uni-obuda.hu" and not "uni-oduba.hu" or 
"uni-obuda.hu.com"). It is possible, of course, that the biggest CA signs public keys only for the bigger 
CAs, bigger ones for the smaller ones, the smaller ones for the local ones etc. 
1.8  Man in the Middle 
It  is  possible  to  eavesdrop  such  a  should-be-secure  connection  in  certain 
conditions, if the public key is tampered with, i.e. the owner of the public key used 
in the connection is not the same as it should be. Just as if an interpreter stood 
between the two parties, as the old joke illustrates it:  
A Spanish speaking bandit held up a bank in Tucson. The sheriff and his deputy 
chased him. When they captured him, and the sheriff, who couldn't speak Spanish, 
asked the bandit, who couldn't speak English, where he'd hidden the money. "I 
will not tell it you", he replied in Spanish. The sheriff put a gun to the bandit's 
head and said to his bi-lingual deputy: "Tell him that if he doesn't tell us where the 
money is right now, I'll blow his brains out." Upon receiving the translation, the 
bandit became very animated. "I've hidden it under the oak tree", he answered in 
Spanish. The sheriff leaned forward. "Yeah? Well..?" The deputy translated: "He 
says he wants to die like a man." 
Technically a man in the middle attack can be performed by somebody (be its  
name: Middle) who can redirect the data flow in the network between the two 
original persons (be the names the classical Alice and Bob). In such a case when 
Alice  sends  her  public  key  (P
A)  to  Bob,  ,  or  Bob  downloads  it  from  Alice's 
homepage, Middle can capture and store for himself the authentic P
A key. Then 
Middle generates a pair of keys (let these be P
M and S
M as the public and secure 
key of Middle, respectively). Middle replaces the original P
A key with his own P
M 
key and sends it forward to Bob. Bob thinks the received P
M key to be P
A (but he 
is wrong, of course). He uses this fake key to encrypt his message to Alice. So the 
encrypted message can easily be decrypted by Middle and only by him. Middle 
decrypts the redirected message, reads it, alters it if he wants, then re-encrypts it 
with the original P
A public key of Alice and sends it forward to Alice. 
Casting: Alice stands for the sheriff, Bob for the bandit and Middle for the deputy. 
None  of  Alice  and  Bob  knows  that  Middle  is  in  the  middle. This  is  why  the 
authenticity of the public keys or certificates must be verified very carefully. 
1.9  Failed Public Key Authenticity 
If somebody tries to browse to an https site, there are two possibilities. In the 
normal case the site sends its certificate to the client. If the browser knows the CA 
who signed the certificate, i.e. has its authentic public key, everything is right, there cannot be anyone in the middle. If not, the browser tries to check the CA 
who signed the certificate of the given https site. There may be a whole chain of 
digital  signatures  of  different  level  CAs.  As  it  was  discussed  above,  a  new 
certificate  (public  key)  from  someone  else  should  be  trusted  (if  it  hasn't  got 
directly from its owner) if it has been signed by someone else you trust. If I can 
trust CA
1, then I can trust everybody who's certificate is signed by CA
1. If the 
certificate of CA
2 is signed by CA
1, it also can be considered as trustworthy and so 
on. This procedure is based on the public key of some top level CAs whose public 
keys are built in the browsers by their developers. 
If the chain of the digital signatures cannot be followed to one of the built-in top 
level CAs, the verification is failed so the client must not trust the site he or she 
wanted to browse. In such a case web browsers usually open a window which says 
that the browser is unable to verify the identity of the website to be browsed as a 
trusted site. 
2  The case of Óbuda University Neptun 
2.1  The situation 
We at Óbuda University have been using Neptun for about a decade as a scholar 
information system. The Neptun server can be contacted for teachers at the url 
https://neptun.uni-obuda.hu/oktato/login.aspx,  for  students  at  the  url 
https://neptun.bmf.hu/hallgato/login.aspx. Browsers say that they cannot confirm 
that  the  connection  is  secure  (See  fig.  2.),  because  the  issuer  is  unknown. 
Browsers cannot check the certificate of the Neptun server because it is issued by 
a  GeoTrust  Inc.,  and  there  is  no  chain  of  trust  to  any  top-level  certificate 
authorities, certificates of whom browsers have, i.e. there is no chain of signatures 
which would lead to any of the issuers of the builtin certificates. 
  
Figure 2. 
Certificate verify error 
At this point there is no way for the users to decide whether their browsers talk to 
the  real  neptun.uni-obuda.hu  or  to  a  pirate  server  which  personalizes  the  real 
neptun.uni-obuda.hu server. 
There exist possibilities to sort out this problem, of course. First of all Óbuda 
University  ought  to  get  a  digital  signature  which  could  be  verified  by  most 
browsers, if not all of them. The second possibility is to give the students and 
teachers a piece of paper holding the fingerprint of the certificate of neptun.uni-
obuda.hu. In the first case the problem would not even exist any more without any 
user action. In the latter case users could verify the fingerprint and if (and only if) 
it was correct they could accept it manually (See fig. 3.) once and for all. Students 
could, of course, make a telephone call to the system administrator in order to 
check  the  fingerprint.  Try  to  imagine  the  situation  when  about  12  thousands 
students ring the sysadmin up with the same question... 
  
Figure 3. 
The fingerprint(s) of the certificate of neptun.uni-obuda.hu 
Without one of these steps there can be no guarantee for the user that his or her 
browser  communicates  with  the  original  and  official  neptun  server  of  Óbuda 
University. In spite of this risk not only students usually accept the certificate 
without verifying but teachers do the same as well. So a man in the middle attack 
can be performed not only theoretically but practically, too. What leads us to face 
this  situation  is  that  that  our  certificate  cannot  be  verified  automatically,  so 
browsers produce a pop-up window. It soon becomes an everyday routine to say 
O.K. on the pop-up window, of course, without a proper personal check. In this 
case it will not be realised by anybody if the certificate (and the server itself, of 
course) is changed. Let us see at least one example, but before that take a look at 
the possible motivations. 
2.2  Possible motivations 
The first step in risk analysing to see what kind of motivations could be taken into 
account.  Why  would  anybody  try  to  realise  a  man-in-the-middle  attack,  why would anybody try to capture the data of the normal and everyday data flow of the 
scholar administration? 
First of all: the only valuable element of data traffic to or from the neptun server 
are the username and password pairs, so it is enough to get only them. What are 
thely good for? 
Having the username and the corresponding password of someone else another 
student can log in to the Neptun to sign the password owner out of courses or 
examination dates e.g. in order to have a free place for another one, even for 
him/herself. This challenge is not  worth the risk of some years to be spent in 
prison. 
If teacher accounts are caught one will be able to sign in in the name of the given 
teacher to do any of the teacher's jobs, e.g. to give a valuable mark to a student. 
Knowing that there are no checks after the teacher filld in the forms of a given 
cours, it could be a bit more interesting possibility. This is also belongs to the 
category of students' tricks, which is not worth the risk of going to prison. 
If an attacker can collect a large number of logins, the situation will be much more 
interesting. 
A not little part of the students must pay a fee of about 700 EUR for their studies. 
Students can change their own bank account number themselves after a successful 
login. Students can or, better to say, must pay any kind of fees via the Neptun. In 
the first step they must make a money transfer to a given bank account. In the 
second step they must use the Neptun to indicate what purpose is the money for. 
After they marked the purpose the university can do a second money transfer to its 
own bank account. Students have the possibility to give order to the Neptun to 
send  their  money  back  to  their  own  bank  account,  number  of  which  can  be 
changed by the students themselves. Let us suppose that the attacker can get the 
logins of about one thousand students (approximately less than 10 percent of our 
students) who are supposed to pay the above mentioned fee. In this case (s)he 
could make money transfers of about 700.000 EUR to a fake bank account. This 
sum is worth a bit of risk to some people, I think. 
Of  course,  all  the  personal  data  of  the  victims  could  be  collected  for  other 
purposes, e.g. to sell it, or to use them in fake transactions, e.g. founding phantom 
enterprises and so on. 
Last but not least the collected passwords could be tried if their owners would use 
the same password at gmail.com, at facebook.com etc., so to try to steal the digital 
personality of the victims. Based upon broken mailboxes e.g. some nigerian type 
tricks could be initiated. 
Summarizing the above possibilities we can state that real and serious motivations 
exist, so our university ought to be much more cautious. 3  An Example for MITM 
3.1  Address Resolution Protocol 
ARP  stands  for  Address  Resolution  Protocol.  This  protocol  is  responsible  for 
controlling the network traffic. If a computer needs to send a packet of data to 
another computer connected to the same subnet, first it should know the 6-byte 
MAC (Media Access Control) address of the network interface of the recipient. In 
TCP/IP networks, the MAC address of a subnet interface can be queried with the 
IP address using the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). 
Sender computer performs an ARP query in broadcast mode by which it asks all 
the computers of the subnet which MAC address belongs to the given IP address. 
The only machine having the appropriate IP address will give its MAC address in 
an ARP reply. In the next step the sender machine can send ethernet frames to the 
given MAC address. Machines store the appropriate IP and MAC address pairs in 
their ARP cache for a given time period.  After that time the sender must ask the 
MAC address again. 
3.2  Getting Access to the Local Subnet 
If someone can crack a computer in a Neptun lab or can use his/her own laptop a 
so-called ARP poisoning can be made. The pirate computer broadcasts fake ARP 
replies let's say one in every second, which replies state that the IP address of the 
default gateway of the given subnet has the MAC address of the pirate computer. 
All the computers in the given subnet will store this pair of data in their ARP 
cache. The result of this is that all of the outgoing ethernet packets will be directed 
to the attacker laptop instead of the real and authentic gateway. You can download 
tools for that stuff from the internet, see e.g. the dsniff package of Dug Song. [1] 
Arpspoof as a part of that package will do the trick. 
Dsniff  was originally  written by Dug Song. Dsniff is a collection of tools for 
network auditing and penetration testing. Dsniff, filesnarf, mailsnarf, msgsnarf, 
urlsnarf, and webspy passively monitor a network for interesting data (passwords, 
e-mail, files, etc.). Arpspoof, dnsspoof, and macof facilitate the interception of 
network traffic normally unavailable to an attacker (e.g, due to layer-2 switching). 
Sshmitm and  webmitm implement active  monkey-in-the-middle attacks against 
redirected SSH and HTTPS sessions by exploiting weak bindings in ad-hoc PKI. 3.3  Fakeing the DNS 
If you give the name of a remote computer as a part of the url, the browser should 
decide the IP address of that computer. In our example the browser should trace 
down the IP address belongs to the name neptun.bmf.hu. This is done by DNS 
(Domain Name Service) servers, servers which can tell which IP address belongs 
to a given computer name. This is done by sending a DNS query to the udp port 
53 of the nearest DNS server. Trying to do this the appropriate data packet which 
normally would go to the default gateway of the subnet in our case goes to the 
pirate laptop. 
The pirate laptop (or desktop computer) can send a fake answer using the above 
mentioned  dnsspoof  to  the  client  browser  which  states  that  the  IP  address  of 
neptun.bmf.hu  is  that  of  the  fake  laptop  itself.  The  original  DNS  queries  for 
neptun.bmf.hu  must  not be  forwarded to the real DNS  server  while any other 
requests are to be forwarded to the original gateway, so it is necessary to enable IP 
forwarding on the attacking machine. By this time we succeeded in becoming a 
man (or woman) in the middle. At this point we redirected http(s) requests to the 
pirate laptop instead of the original and authentic neptun.bmf.hu. 
3.4  Personalizing the Original Server 
At this moment the situation is the following in the computer lab, more precisely 
on the subnet  which  the pirate  machine belongs  to. All  the data transfer goes 
through the attacking machine because of the fake ARP answers. DNS queries for 
neptun.bmf.hu are also faked by dnsspoof, so https requests for neptun.bmf.hu and 
only for that goes to the attacking machine instead of the original one. All other 
traffic is redirected to the original gateway of the subnet. 
The  attacker  saves  the  original  opening  pages  of  neptun.bmf.hu,    at 
https://neptun.bmf.hu/oktato/login.aspx  for  teachers,  and  at  the  url 
https://neptun.bmf.hu/hallgato/login.aspx    for  students  which  is  not  a  complex 
task. By the help of the webmitm program (web monkey in the middle, part of the 
dsniff package of Dug Song), the pirate laptop can be used as a transparent https 
proxy  with  the  addition  that  it  logs  the  user  names  (neptun  codes)  and  the 
belonging passwords. So the situation is just like in the story of the bandit, the 
sheriff and the deputy, but neither the students nor the teachers will know that they 
have a deputy as an interpreter. 
Only  a  fake  certificate  is  needed  which  can  be  produced  by  openssl  which 
contains  the  same  names  than  the  original  certificate  of  the  authentic 
neptun.bmf.hu. Of course the value of the public key  will be different, so the 
fingerprint  of  the  certificate  will  differ  as  well  but  nobody  will  recognise  it 
because everybody has accustomed to the annoying warnings about the certificate. 5  Summary 
If  the  certificate  of  neptun.uni-obuda.hu  was  issued  by  a  verifiable  certificate 
authority (CA) then no man in the middle attacks could successfully be performed 
without the serious carelessness of the end-users. But students and teachers has 
got used to those  windows of the browser in which it complains on the certificate. 
So they will enter an OK, as they did it before so many times as well without 
noticing that the fingerprint of the certificate has changed. 
This is a serious security hole which must not exist at our university especially 
because one and a half year ago we were in the same situation for many months. 
Of course I did not make the above described procedure to steal passwords and 
other personal data. I can only hope that nobody else did, do nor will try it. Or 
could this backdoor be closed? 
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